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Everyone's got to be different. You can't copy anybody and end up with anything. If you 
copy, it means you're working without any real feeling. And without feeling, whatever you do 
amounts to nothing. 
No two people on earth are alike, and it's got to be that way in music or it isn't music. 
I never forget this wonderful old Spaniard Pablo Casals, who played the cello once on TV. When 
he finished some Bach he was interviewed by some American chick. 'Every time you play it, 
it's different', she gushed. 
'It must be different', said Casals. 'How can it be otherwise? Nature is so. And we are nature.' 
So there you are. You can't even be like you once were yourself, let alone like somebody else. 
Billie Holiday, 
Lady Sings the Blues 
j * 
An American making his first visit to Newfoundland was surprised by the 
familiarity of the consumer economy and was finally driven to ask, "What 
does this country produce?" This question would not have arisen in the nine-
teenth century when there was a considerable volume of domestic manufac-
tures and services, but it was reasonable after a half century of economic de-
velopment which obliterated in Newfoundland and Canada the end products 
which reflect the genius or peculiarity of the people. It is the absence of such 
products, more than statistics on foreign ownership and control, that indicates 
dependence and underdevelopment. While it is a phenomenon that charac-
terizes all Canada, the Atlantic Provinces suffer added burdens of low per 
capita income and high unemployment, resulting in part from the ill-grace of 
American and Canadian firms in locating their plants and offices mainly in 
the Central Provinces. 
* I am indebted to G.K. Goundrey, S.O. Pierson and G M. Story for reading this paper and 
offering helpful corrections and suggestions. A version was read at a conference on the Metropolis-
Hinterland Thesis at Saint Mary's University in Halifax, in March 1974. 
1 See T.W. Acheson "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910", 
Acadiensis, I, no. 2. 
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In the Maritimes underdevelopment seems a sorry descent from those 
heady days when it possessed one of the world's foremost shipbuilding indus-
tries, the third or fourth largest merchant marine, financial institutions which 
were the core of many of the present Canadian giants, and an industrial 
structure growing as fast as that of Central Canada.1 But Mainlanders of all 
stripes are inclined to unite in the view that Newfoundlanders have no cause 
to grieve: rather than slipping from greatness, it is thought that the Island has 
been raised to underdevelopment from a state of barbarity.2 To argue other-
wise is to evoke the skepticism which met the honourable Mr. Ferrier when 
he assured the Legislative Council of Canada in 1865 that the people of the 
Lower Provinces were "energetic, active, industrious people, quite equal to 
ourselves".3 
Underdevelopment and dependence is an historical problem arising from 
an accumulation of conditions and events which strengthen some countries 
and regions relative to others. Three broad and interrelated explanations are 
generally advanced for its presence: a poor or deteriorating resource endow-
ment; an accumulating relative disadvantage with respect to external econo-
mies; and political and economic exploitation which may be as much in-
ternally generated as externally imposed. The inclination of the metropolis 
is to advance the first as a reason for the second, while the periphery argues 
the third as the cause of the second. 
With respect to the first explanation, Ian Weinberg made the obvious 
point that "some new nations may never industrialize because they lack the 
basic resources."4 But this is to equate development and industrialization in 
a way that is not obvious. Andrew Kamarack avoids this contentious infer-
ence simply by arguing that comparative growth rates can be a poor indicator 
of economic performance since "In some countries, even with the best will 
in the world, the economy may not be able to grow very rapidly."5 But in 
both cases the assumption is that the endowment (in its widest sense) may be 
the barrier to development, and this has been frequently advanced for the 
Atlantic Provinces and especially Newfoundland. Both S.A. Saunders and 
Professor J.M.S. Careless, and H.A. Innis before them, imply that the stagna-
tion of Atlantic Canada was the outcome of inexorable technological changes 
that left its endowment marginal to the pattern of growth in twentieth cen-
tury North America.6 With respect to Newfoundland, MacKay was convinced, 
2 Although suggested with great delicacy, this is an inference in Professor J.M.S. Careless, 
"Aspects of Metropolitanism in Atlantic Canada" (Centennial Seminar, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 1967). 
3 The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada, Ed. P.B. Waite (Toronto, 1964), p. 33. 
4 "The Concept of Modernization: An Unfinished Chapter in Sociological Theory", Perspectives 
on Modernization, Ed. E. Harvey (Toronto, 1972). 
5 'The Appraisal of Country Economic Performance", Economic Development and Cultural 
Change XVIII (1970), p. 160. 
6 Careless, op.cit., and S.A. Saunders, The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces 
(Ottawa, 1939) pp. 92-94. 
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following World War II, that the country could not decently support 300,000 
people, and more recently Parzival Copes has argued that it might support 
that number but certainly not its current half million.7 
The argument that underdevelopment is a problem of external economies, 
such as access to large markets and conglomerations of capital structures and 
skilled labour markets, implies that policy changes might manipulate a more 
favourable distribution. The modern thesis has its roots in J.S. Mill and was 
a basis for the 'national policy' which favoured (albeit with ultimate dis-
tortions) the growth of Central Canada. Richard Baldwin and Jonathan Levin 
have shown that the problem can emerge from characteristics of the produc-
tion functions of export resource industries established in newly settled or 
'traditional' economies.8 Melville Watkins has added that the problem may 
become entrenched through the withering of domestic entrepreneurship and 
the growth of an inhibiting export mentality.9 Historians who identify the 
weakening endowment of Atlantic Canada as a cause of its relative decline, 
invariably show how this affected factor costs and access to markets. But 
an interesting variant on the argument has been developed by Professor 
George. He finds that neither production nor distribution costs can explain 
the difference in per capita manufacturing output between Nova Scotia and 
Ontario/Quebec, and identifies the province's problems as a weakness in 
the quality of entrepreneurship.10 In Newfoundland a similar argument on 
relative costs might be more difficult to advance; but from the advocates 
of the 'new industrialism' at the end of the nineteenth century to the planners 
of the Department of Regional Economic Expansion today, there has always 
been an argument that a dose of 'infrastructure' would create external econo-
mies and unleash the development potential of the country. 
The exploitative hypothesis of backwardness and dependence has none 
of the comforting neutrality of the other two, and its pertinence is increas-
ingly well established. Even so cautious an economist as Angus Maddison 
concludes that the relative and absolute decline of India from the eighteenth 
century was in good part due to the conscious design and accidental iniqui-
ties of the East India Company and Whitehall.11 S. Sideri calmly and pains-
takingly has demonstrated how political power, exercised through commer-
cial policy, augmented the wealth of Britain and the stagnation of Portugal.12 
7 R.A. MacKay, et. al., Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (Toronto, 
1946) and P. Copes, The Resettlement of Fishing Communities in Newfoundland (Canadian 
Council on Rural Development, 1972.) 
8 Baldwin, "Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Regions", The Manchester School, 
XXIV, (1956), and Levin, The Export Economies (Cambridge, Mass., 1960). 
9 Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", Canadian Journal of Economics and Polit-
ical Science, XXIX, (1963), p. 150. 
10 A Leader and a Laggard (Toronto, 1970), pp. 166-167. 
11 Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth (London, 1971). 
12 Sideri, Trade and Power (Rotterdam, 1970). 
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Keith Griffen has shown that in Spanish America progress has been greatest 
when contact with the United States and Western Europe have been weak-
est.13 For Latin America a thesis of metropolitan domination has been shaped 
into a radical tool of analysis by scholars like Griffen, Celso Furtado and 
A.G. Frank.14 Within Canada, however, application of a metropolitan thesis 
has tended to stress the neutrality of a changing world technology and market 
demand, although recently a more radical interpretation has been developed 
with respect to Canada's external relationships.15 Newfoundland has been 
as underdeveloped in its radical intelligentsia as in any other dimension, 
and no scholarly tradition of exploitation has been established, apart from 
the liberal hypothesis of retarded settlement. But the argument that New-
foundland's prosperity has been stunted by British malevolence and neglect, 
Canadian machinations, and wily international corporations can be found in 
nationalist historians such as Judge Prowse, the debates of the House of 
Assembly and the daily conversations of Newfoundlanders.16 
It is fashionable these days to use neoclassical models that assume per-
fectly operating factor and products markets to show that history unfolds 
in the only way it can.17 These exercises are frequently unconvincing because 
of their circularity: the evidence of what did happen is used in restrictive 
models to show that only that could happen. Little weight is allowed for the 
cumulative effect on a country of making the right decisions, maximizing all 
the opportunities, and, above all, defining economic, social and cultural 
goals and means independently of modal patterns emanating from metropoli-
tan countries. The purpose of this paper is to suggest, but hardly to prove, 
that the failure to do these things resulted in Newfoundland being poorer 
and more dependent than she need have been. Newfoundland's resource 
base was not poor relative to its population, but it was badly managed. A con-
sequence of this was that income was lower than it could have been, and the 
country was politically less viable than it might have been. It would be possi-
ble to develop an exploitative thesis of Newfoundland's development, but 
the exploitation exercised from outside is a less convincing explanation of 
the country's problems than the inability or unwillingness of its elite to mobi-
lize the country to manoeuvre more effectively in the space allowed by a 
13 Griffen. Underdevelopment in Spanish America (Cambridge, Mass., 1969). 
14 These are only some of the better known among a very vigorous school in Latin America 
and the West Indies. For a thorough review of the historiographical debate see Social and 
Economic Studies, XXII (1973.) 
15 Thus Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender (Toronto, 1970) who also acknowledges some of the 
regional implications. 
16 A precious manifestation of this was an impassioned statement by a young lady of the St. 
John's upper classes (whose ancestors were among the early residents) that "those bloody British 
came over here and killed off our Beothuks". 
17 A classic example is Donald N. McCloskey. "Did Victorian Britain Fail?", Economic History 
Review. XXIII (1970) 
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metropolitan-dominated world. In Newfoundland the chains of metropolitan 
domination too often appeared golden. 
II 
A condition of underdevelopment may be indicated by low per capita 
income and an input-output structure with relatively few domestic inter-
industry transactions. Dependence, on the other hand, can subsist with com-
paratively high per capita income, and is suggested by such things as a high 
ratio of foreign transactions to domestic product, a high average and marginal 
propensity to import, a growth rate determined by one or a few trading part-
ners, and a heavy dependence upon external direct investment, management 
and entrepreneurship.18 It is useful, although not always customary, to dis-
tinguish between underdevelopment and dependence. A peasant economy 
may be underdeveloped relative to its material and human resources, or 
some external definition of how much these could produce, but nontheless 
enjoy a high degree of self-determination. An industrial economy, such as 
Canada's, may be highly developed in terms of its factor productivity but 
extremely dependent. In the North American context, Newfoundland is an 
example of an underdeveloped and a dependent economy in that its produc-
tivity is relatively low (as suggested by prevailing wage rates) and its self-
determination extremely limited. The roots of this condition lie in the phe-
nomenon of modern economic growth as it confronted Newfoundland's 
small, pre-industrial economy at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Newfoundland's potential for economic growth and development at this 
time was conditioned by two features: it was a very small economy with a 
total product not much in excess of the export value of the Canadian cheese 
industry, and it was a pre-industrial economy with a low level of factor special-
ization and market activity. The first characteristic — that of size — has 
been explored by W.G. Demas.19 He argues that there are only two basic 
models for transforming underdeveloped economies. Assuming in each case 
that trade is balanced (there are no net capital movements) and no net pay-
ments of profits abroad, then a country may either pursue an import sub-
stitution strategy where 
dY/dt > dX/dt Y = Gross Domestic Product 
(i.e. gross domestic expenditure) 
X = Exports (Imports) 
or it may choose an export led growth strategy where 
dY/dt < dX/dt 
18 No such list can be complete since dependence is to some extent unique in its characteristics 
to each case. But an excellent analytic framework is given in S. Sideri, Trade and Power, pp. 
11-12. 
19 Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries (Montreal, 1965) pp. 67-68. 
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According to Demas, the small country embarking upon modern economic 
growth (development) has no efficient choice between the two models. The 
first is directly aimed at escaping from foreign dependence as much as achiev-
ing growth of per capita income but is only practical for big countries (or 
countries with reasonable prospects for developing relatively large domestic 
markets) with diverse factor endowments. In this environment an infant in-
dustry argument may be advanced to stimulate development along a broad 
front for a growing domestic market. But even then reduced dependence 
in any meaningful sense is far from guaranteed (as the Canadian case so richly 
demonstrates) unless capital requirements for growth and diversification are 
generated domestically or acquired abroad in portfolio form and liquidated 
during a creditor's crisis, and unless firms in the new sectors are truly in-
digenous firms.20 Demas believes that a small country adopting the import 
substitution model risks impoverishment through loss of export income and 
lower cost imports. The only way it can modify dependence upon export-
led growth is by manipulating demand into nontradeable sectors such as 
construction. Even if the small country cannot escape foreign trade depend-
ence, it may be able to live with it if there are gains in per capita income and 
if entrepreneurship, investment and technical innovation are generated or 
controlled in the domestic economy.21 
The issue of market size has been an omnipresent element in discussions 
of Newfoundland's development potential from the nineteenth century to 
the present. In the last half of the nineteenth century the rapid international 
movement of production factors into unsettled territories still left it an open 
question as to which countries had prospects of achieving large market size. In 
Newfoundland modest hopes were placed on the possibilities for growth and a 
larger internal market offered by land settlement, the stimulation of manu-
facturing, and the provision of a railway system which was to lower unit 
costs and widen markets. The results of this Newfoundland 'National Policy' 
were disappointing (as they were in Canada until the wheat boom), and hind-
sight suggests that the prospects were hopeless. Newfoundland's farming land 
was very costly to develop and remained marginal relative to the agricultural 
frontiers opening in the western and southern hemispheres. In the absence 
20 Iceland, with its centuries of crushing dominion by Denmark, did not have any illusions 
about foreign ownership and good corporate citizens. Thus in 1918 foreigners were prohibited 
from establishing businesses in the country unless they were residents. See William Chamberlin, 
Economic Development of Iceland Through World War II (New York, 1968 reprint), p. 35. 
21 In other words, Demas sees the possibility of reducing the list of dependent characteristics. 
22 For an analysis of the political origin of this strategy see J.K. Hiller, "Whiteway and Pro-
gress". Newfoundland Quarterly, LXVIII (1971) and for a discussion of some of its economic 
dimensions. David Alexander. "A New Newfoundland: The Traditional Economy and Develop-
ment to 1934" (Paper delivered to the Canadian Historical Association, Kingston, 1973), pp. 
30-40. 
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of an export sector which would rapidly build up population, there was little 
chance (despite revenue tariffs which came to exceed Canadian protective 
tariffs) of modern secondary industry taking root. Table I, for example, 
indicates that the domestic market for manufactures amounted to as little as 
$14 million in 1911." Compounding this obstacle was the absence of any in-
dustrial heritage in the labour force and among entrepreneurs upon which 
innovative manufacturing could be developed for export markets. Despite all 
these difficulties it is hard to fault an effort to stimulate the growth of indus-
tries oriented to the domestic market, for the avenues to export-led growth 
were dismal in the late nineteenth century. Export prices for salt codfish fell 
by 32 per cent between 1880/84 and 1895/99 and volumes by 20 per cent, 
while the terms of trade seem to have moved sharply against the industry 
from the late 1880's.24 In other potential export sectors, such as minerals 
and forest products, there was no clamour from overseas markets for New-
foundland resources. 
Development efforts shifted to export-led growth around the turn of the 
century. This reflected the upswing in international trade arising from the 
'new industrialism' of Western Europe and the United States and the resulting 
demand for foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. The establishment of the 
Bell Island Iron mines in the 1890's was probably critical in centering political 
attention on the new export prospects of land resources, and when this was 
followed by the Harmsworth and Reed pulp and paper developments in Cen-
tral Newfoundland, the development pattern was fixed until the Dominion's 
collapse in 1934. This export orientated strategy would have been more fruitful 
if it had focussed on marine rather than land resources.25 But in its historical 
context the error is understandable. Since at least the 1880's the fisheries had 
failed to provide employment at acceptable levels of income for the rapidly 
increasing population and it was widely acknowledged in Newfoundland that 
diversity in the sources of National Income was essential to the country's 
economic and political stability. Since diversification by import substitution 
had not been successful, and since Newfoundland had neither the capital, the 
entrepreneurship nor the access to essential technology to enter export mar-
kets in industrial raw materials in its own right, then the international cor-
poration — that beckoning gigolo of the expanding metropolis — became a 
necessary partner. Gigolos have an excellent eye for the purses of ugly mai-
dens and hopeful widows, and despite the blandishments of Prime Ministers 
23 In 1912 when imported rubber boots began to oust locally produced fishermen's boots, 
St. John's businessmen travelled to the Mainland to investigate the technology of the rubber 
product. They discovered that the smallest efficient plant could satisfy demand in the domestic 
market with a month's production. See Alexander, "New Newfoundland", p. 40. 
24 See Alexander, Ibid., pp. 23-24 and Table 5. 
25 This is explored later in this paper. 
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TABLE 1 
ESTIMATE OF THE DOMESTIC MARKET 
FOR MANUFACTURES, CIRCA 1911 
Dutiable Imports 
Home Consumption 
Duties Collected 
Less Natural Products and 
items for further process-
ing and duties collected 
thereon 
Free Articles 
Home Consumption 
Less Intermediate Goods, 
materials etc. for enclave 
industried, natural pro-
ducts (including flour) 
and free imports for govern 
ment and religious bodies 
Domestic Manufactures* 
Less Exports of Domestic Manu 
factures 127,128 3,524,936 
$14,115,080 
•Includes sawmill production, but excludes pulp and paper. For some sectors, the Gross Value 
of Production is estimated by doubling reported wage bills. The estimate is undervalued because 
of non-reporting by some major firms. 
Source: Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1911 and Customs Returns published in the 
Journal of the House of Assembly, 1911. 
Morris and Squires, the corporations found more attractive partners else-
where. The Corner Brook paper mill and the Buchans mines were the only 
important additions to primary manufacturing and resource development be-
fore the collapse of the international economy, and Newfoundland, in the 
1930s. 
$ 8,131,440 
2,768,527 
10,899,967 
773,332 $10,126,635 
5,228,721 
4,765,212 463,509 
10,590,144 
3,652,064 
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During these years, Newfoundland lurched into many of the development 
problems confronting any small country. The attempt to expand production 
for domestic markets in the nineteenth century did not have a direct impact, 
in terms of lost export income and high priced substitutes for imported goods, 
simply because so little labour and capital was diverted from the export 
sectors. But the railway development which was linked to the strategy im-
posed heavy and inflexible overseas debt charges which depressed the growth 
of domestic incomes and diverted government revenues from areas offering 
more fruitful economic and social returns. The re-orientation of development 
efforts to export-led growth did have the effect of diversifying the sources of 
national income, but only to the extent of replacing a domestically owned and 
controlled one-product export economy with a largely foreign owned and 
controlled three-product economy. By concentrating its development efforts 
on sectors which could only be developed by overseas corporations, and by 
its failure or inability to negotiate a Newfoundland participation in these 
ventures, income was lost to overseas, there was a minimal development of 
industrial linkages, and opportunities for nurturing domestic management 
skills and entrepreneurship were neglected. 
A central issue in Newfoundland's development efforts was a second char-
acteristic of the economy — its overall low level of labor and capital specializ-
ation and market activity. This presumably restricted the growth of employ-
ment and per capita income and contributed to the substantial net emigration 
dating from the mid-1880s. The problem of 'modernizing' such an economy 
has been explored by Hymer and Resnick in the case of an agrarian economy 
with non-agricultural activities.26 Reality is simplified by assuming that the 
rural economy produces two goods, T ' (food) which is traded for 'M' (imports), 
and 'Z', a heterogeneous collection of goods and services which is produced 
and consumed but not traded. Accordingly, the production possibilities 
curve is, 
F = F(Z) 
with imports acquired according to the exchange equation, 
M = P(F - F) 
where 'P' is the exchange rate between 'F' and 'M', and 'F' is the amount 
of food consumed in the domestic economy. Utility in the economy is maxim-
ized by the function, 
U = U(Z,F,M) 
which is subject to both the production and trading constraint. The model 
traces out the impact on the agrarian economy of an increase in 'P'. The 
26 Stephen Hymer and Stephen Resnick, "A model of an Agrarian Economy with Non agri-
cultural Activities", American Economic Review, LIX (1969). 
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response is specialization into ' F production, the disappearance of 'Z' and a 
higher level of income rising from the productivity gains possible in 'F 
production but not in 'Z' production. The two crucial assumption lying 
behind this model are that factor substitution is possible between 'F and 'Z', 
and that 'Z' goods are 'inferior goods'. The model stresses the benefits of 
income growth (total and per capita) over any intangible losses from a narrow-
ing of the range of domestically produced end products.27 
Superficially the rural Newfoundland economy shared these characteris-
tics and should have responded similarily to a price stimulus in the market 
sector. But a number of difficulties limit the model's usefulness in the New-
foundland case. To begin with, there is the hoary issue of the 'open access' 
fishery and whether an increase in demand would not simply yield an ex-
pansion of the traditional economy rather than the emergence of a smaller, 
more specialized and more heavily capitalized fishing labor force. In the 
period under study this is probably not a major issue. Despite the distortions 
in the use of labour and capital that can emerge under open access conditions, 
and which could be serious in an economy so massively dominated by fishing 
as was Newfoundland's,28 there is no evidence that, at the time, the resource 
was over-exploited. A second difficulty is the assumption of factor substitu-
tion (mainly labour) between ' F and 'Z' production. In Newfoundland, an all-
year fishery was not possible except along the South Coast, and the logical 
way to maximize personal incomes was through occupational pluralism rather 
than specialization. That is, given the seasonality of the resource the basic 
question is whether in Newfoundland's circumstances modernization of the 
rural economy and maximization of output and income could best have been 
achieved through a drive for specialization of labour and capital or through 
occupational pluralism and non-market production. It was this issue, as will 
be seen, that tantalized planners in the 1930s and 40s and which continues 
to be raised to this day. But it was not an alternative which has met ready 
acceptance in government (for perfectly honourable reasons) and from the 
late nineteenth century, development and modernization has implied special-
ization and industrialization of the labour force along the lines suggested 
by the Hymer-Resnick model. 
The major conundrum of the Newfoundland economy in the early twenti-
eth century is why the re-orientation towards export-led growth did not con-
27 Consideration of this is ruled out by the assumption that 'Z' goods are inferior goods. But the 
problem is complex, for there is an issue of 'indivisibilities'. That is. as a group 'Z' goods may be 
inferior goods, but not all 'Z' goods may be considered so by their producers/consumers. But if 
factor substitution between 'Z' and ' F is a discontinuous rather than a continuous function, a 
great deal which is desirable will be given up for a marginal aggregate gain. In the process future 
development prospects may be weakened by the narrowing of skills and imagination. 
28 See Richard C. Bishop. "Limitation of Entry in the United States Fishing Industry: An Econo-
mics Appraisal of a Proposed Policy", Land Economics, XLIX (1973). 
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centrate more effectively on the fishing industry. The accepted view at the 
time, and since, is that there was no alternative other than a development of 
land-based primary industries to absorb surplus labour from the rural econ-
omy. But to demonstrate that the fishing industry did not provide sufficient 
employment at satisfactory income levels is far from proving that it could not, 
either alone or in conjunction with other economic activities. A significant 
increment in fishing income might have floated the country over its railway, 
war and other development-debt burdens, and introduced a dynamic into the 
well-being, self-confidence and initiative of the country. The fact that Ice-
land, a staggeringly impoverished and exploited country in the nineteenth 
century, with no significant commercial fishery before 1890, and with fewer 
alternative resources than Newfoundland, was nontheless able to establish 
itself during this century as an independent and prosperous country on the 
basis of the North Atlantic fishery, invites a fresh examination of the oppor-
tunities that existed in Newfoundland. 
That the Newfoundland fishing industry did not perform to its potential 
during the first decade of the century was widely accepted at the time. For 
example, the 1910 Annual Report of the Department of Marine and Fisheries 
summed up almost a decade and a half of critical review. It noted the growing 
presence of foreign fishing vessels in Newfoundland waters and speculated on 
its implications for the country. The heavy dependence of the industry on 
salted cod was a matter of concern, for fish products moving into the Ameri-
can market were increasingly diverse and "the time will not be far distant 
when salt cod . . . will be for the few markets who cannot possibly do without 
i t . . ." Several English and American firms had approached the Department 
with plans for establishing processing plants, and it wondered why "New-
foundlanders should not be the pioneers in their own country, and in a busi-
ness they should know well how to conduct with success". The state of the 
herring fishery raised the exasperated comment that "There seems to be no 
adequate reason . . . why this very valuable adjunct to the products of our 
seas has been so neglected and allowed to lapse . . . ." The Report wondered 
why Newfoundlanders had ignored the halibut fishery "considering the im-
portance of this fishery in other countries, and the remunerative returns re-
ceived from its prosecution, the largeness of the demand, and the increase of 
the distributing centres for the United States and Canada . . . ." The same 
question was raised about turbot. In the refined cod liver oil industry, com-
parative Norwegian and Newfoundland statistics generated the caustic com-
ment, "It will be readily seen that we are not in the business at all . . . . " 
Even though the heart of the Newfoundland industry was salted cod, the 
Report speculated whether the country could even hold its present markets 
since "competitors are beating the Newfoundland article by their improved 
methods, better handling, intelligent and intimate business relations with the 
purchasers, and their anxiety to please the customer in every way". While 
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all this had been said before, and would be said again, the 1910 Report was 
redolent with the frustration aroused by too many lost opportunities: "Matters 
in connection with the fishery exports and products have reached such a 
condition that it is a case of 'Wake up, Newfoundland'."29 
The charge that the Newfoundland industry was sluggish in responding to 
improving opportunities appears to be true even of the salt cod sector where 
its competitive position should have been strong. Between 1867 and 1913 the 
F.O.B. value of world exports priced in current $US grew by 133 per cent,30 
while salt cod exports from the three great world producers (Newfoundland, 
Norway and Canada) priced in current SCanadian grew by slightly over 128 
per cent. This was hardly an insignificant performance for a long established 
and traditional food industry that was supposed to be in decline.31 But follow-
ing recovery from the disastrous 1890s, Newfoundland's performance in the 
industry did not show the vigour of its European competitors. Over the period 
1898-1913 exports of salted fish by Iceland, Norway, Newfoundland and Can-
ada grew from some $12.7 million to $27.7 million or at a compound annual 
rate of about 5 per cent. Newfoundland's exports grew at 3.27 per cent, the 
lowest among the producers, with Canada's at 3.45 per cent, Norway at 4.75 
per cent and the fledgeling Icelandic industry at 10.58 per cent.32 Between 
1898 and 1909 Newfoundland was the largest exporter in terms of volume, 
accounting for between 40-45 per cent of total volume to 30-35 per cent for 
Norway and 20-25 per cent for Canada; but in the four years prior to out-
break of war the Norwegian and Newfoundland positions were reversed with 
the Canadian share slipping to under 20 per cent of market volume. In addition 
29 Journal of the House of Assembly, 1911, Appendix. The quotations are from, respectively, 
pp. 414, 414, 419, 414, 427, 437 and 436. 
30 Calculated from W.S. and W.E. Woytinsky, World Commerce and Governments (New York. 
1955) p. 38. Table 13. 
31 This and subsequent calculations, unless otherwise indicated, are preliminary results based 
upon calculations from the Trade and Commerce Reports published in the Canada Sessional 
Papers between 1891 and 1914. For the Icelandic data I am greatly indebted to Mr. Jens Hav-
gaard Jensen of Aarhus, Denmark.
 Y 
32 The fitted trend equations (Yt = ab l) are: 
Y 
•World" exports Y = (18.785.000) (1.0507) l 
Newfoundland Exports Y{ = ( 6,584,600) (1.0327) x 
Y 
Canadian Exports Y{ = ( 3,286,400) (1.0345) l 
Norwegian Exports Y{ = ( 7,478,000) (1.0475)Xt 
Icelandic Exports Yt = ( 1,240.100) (1.1058)Xt 
Volumes are measured in pounds. 
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to this relative decline in production, Newfoundland suffered from the lower 
prices which its fish earned in international markets. Table 2 indicates that 
if Newfoundland salt cod had commanded the Norwegian price in the mar-
kets, the gross returns to the fishing economy would have been 25-50 per 
cent higher in most years than those actually realised, and National Income 
might have been as much as 10 per cent higher.33 Moreover, the complaint 
of the Department of Marine and Fisheries that Newfoundland was neither 
diversifying her industry nor exploiting the demand for new fishery products, 
seems to be true. Table 3 shows that in 1913, the Newfoundland fishery was 
much more dependent upon salt cod than was Norway or even the newly 
formed Icelandic industry. 
The expansion of output that was achieved in Newfoundland during these 
years was more a function of increased labour effort than quantitative and 
qualitative increments in capital inputs — that is, a simple expansion of the 
traditional fishing economy rather than its transformation. The intercensal 
mean labour force, for example, expanded from 38,960 in the depressed 
1890's to 42,500 in 1900-11, but there was no statistically significant increase 
in average physical output per worker in salt cod production.34 Between 1901 
and 1911 the number of sailing vessels over 60 tons expanded only from 228 
to 292; the number of boats of 4 to 30 quintal capacity fell from 25,078 to 
24,720; and boats over 30 quintal capacity fell from 1,376 to 1,120.35 An 
index of investment in gear (constructed from customs returns of 17 items 
entering directly into catching and gear manufacturing and including gaso-
line engines)36 rose in current prices from $285,436 in 1898/9 - 1899/1900 to 
some $706,467 in 1912/13 -1913/14. But this 147 per cent increase is not, on 
further analysis, terribly impressive quite apart from the issue of rapidly rising 
prices in this period. It means that investment per male fisherman for items 
on the index rose in current dollars from around $7 to about $16 with the in-
crement heavily weighted at the end of the period by imported gasoline en-
gines. Moreover, a simple regression of changes in output in the salt cod 
industry on changes in investment (by first differences) between 1892 and 
1913/14 indicates a high standard error and a low coefficient of determin-
33 See table 4 for estimates of Newfoundland National Income. 
34 See Alexander, "New Newfoundland", Table 3, p. 19. 
35 Census of Newfoundland, 1911, Vol. 1, Table XX. 
36 The index was completed by the author not so much to attempt an estimate of capital stock 
and the actual level of investments but to identify trends in investment. The 17 items included 
in the index should capture such trends because many, if not all, of the items are correlated with 
items that are excluded, such as boats and vessels. 
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TABLE 2 
HYPOTHETICAL EXPORT VALUES OF NEWFOUNDLAND SALT COD 
AT NORWEGIAN REALISED PRICE LEVELS 
Year 
1898/1899 
1899/1900 
1900/1901 
1901/1902 
1902/1903 
1903/1904 
1904/1905 
1905/1906 
1906/1907 
1907/1908 
1908/1909 
1909/1910 
1910/1911 
1911/1912 
1912/1913 
1913/1914 
(1) 
Reported 
Newfoundland 
Receipts 
$ 
4,445,033 
5,453,538 
5,171,910 
5,509,728 
5,633,072 
5,943,063 
6,108,618 
7,864,719 
7,873,172 
7,820,387 
7,398,536 
7,307,778 
6,544,604 
8,001,703 
7,097,839 
8,071,889 
(2) 
Hypothetical Receipts 
if Norwegian Prices 
Obtained 
S 
5,809,889 
8,172,068 
7,941,207 
7,434,692 
8,884,376 
9,537,847 
8,471,528 
11,296,074 
11,215,694 
11,545,304 
11,680,446 
9,001,596 
8,663,187 
9,810,531 
8,850,40s 
9,890,701 
(3) 
Difference 
$ 
1,364,856 
2,718,530 
2,769,297 
1,924,964 
3,251,295 
3,594,784 
2,362,910 
3,431,355 
3,342,522 
3,724,917 
4,281,910 
1,693,818 
2,118,583 
1,808,828 
862,563 
1,818,812 
(3) as % 
of (2) 
% 
31 
50 
54 
35 
58 
60 
39 
44 
42 
48 
58 
23 
32 
23 
11 
22 
Source: Canadian Sessional Papers, Trade and Commerce 'Reports' 
ation.37 Multiple regression might bring out the impact of investment on 
37 Xj = Changes in output, in dollars 
X- = Changes in investment, in dollars 
X{ =48.299 +4 .74X 2 
S X,X-L1A2 
= 859.432 
r = 0.482 (t = 2.362. significant at 97% ) 
b = 4.74 (t = 2.46. significant at 97% ) 
Acadiensis 17 
TABLE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF FISH EXPORTS IN 1913 
NORWAY 
Salted Cod $13,108,604 
Salted Herring 3,215,089 
Other Salted- 2,424,328 
Fresh 2,421,407 
Lobsters 363,113 
Roe 339,261 
$21,871,802 
ICELAND 
Salted Cod $ 2,480,588 
Salted Herring 1,063,055 
Fresh 137,162 
Roe 20,213 
Salmon & Pickled 5,665 
$ 3,706,683 
NEWFOUNDLAND 
Salted Cod $ 8,071,889 
Pickled Fish 425,703 
Lobster 347,941 
Pickled Herring 319,532 
Pickled Salmon 101,498 
Frozen Herring 86,113 
Bulk Herring 63,901 
Haddock 26,246 
Fresh Salmon 21,794 
$ 9,706,683 
Sources: For Newfoundland and Norway, Canada Sessional Papers: Trade and Commerce 
'Reports'. For Iceland, data from published sources provided by Mr. Jens Hargaard 
Jenson of Aarhus, Denmark. 
rising output, but failing the attempt it is a reasonable guess that the growth 
of inputs in these years was principally a function of increased labour inputs. 
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Strong demand and prices persisted through the war years, but given the 
less favourable trends in the 1920s and 1930s it might be argued that the 
weakness of innovative investment in catching, processing and marketing 
was thereby justified. But it is an odd argument which awards prescience to 
a country for permitting its most important source of employment and income 
to develop into a dinosaur. The failure to expand the industry and, more 
important, to transform it in terms of the diversity of output and the tech-
nologies of catching, processing, packaging and organized marketing, simply 
left Newfoundland fishermen less competitive than their rivals.38 
If there was an opportunity in the first two decades of the century for mod-
ernizing and expanding the industry — an industry where most of the re-
turns went to Newfoundland production factors and which had better linkage 
prospects than the foreign controlled enclave industries — why was the re-
sponse so inadequate? The answer must surely rest in a weakness in en-
trepreneurship and capital supply. Ronald McKinnon has argued that missed 
opportunities of this kind are common in underdeveloped economies because 
of fragmented capital markets: 
The scope for intertemporal decision making, within which the entre-
preneur maximizes his utility, can usefully be reduced to three com-
ponents: (1) his endowment or owned déployable capital; (2) his own 
peculiar productive or investment opportunity; and (3) his market op-
portunities for external lending or borrowing over time outside his own 
enterprise. At a very general level, a fragmented capital market, which 
is characteristic of underdevelopment, is one where the three com-
ponents are badly correlated. That is, entrepreneurs with potential pro-
duction opportunities lack resources of their own, as well as access to 
external financing. Those with substantial endowments may lack 'in-
ternal' production opportunities (unless such opportunities are arti-
ficially generated by public intervention) and have no 'external' invest-
ment outlets at rates of return that accurately reflect the prevailing 
scarcity of capital. The resulting dispersion in real rates of return re-
flects the misallocation of existing capital and depresses new accumu-
lation.39 
38 For a detailed analysis of the inter-war salt cod industry, see G.M. Gerhardsen, Salted Cod 
and Related Species (Washington, 1949). The point here is that even if demand for a product is 
inelastic, the situation facing any one producer might be highly elastic — it expands at the ex-
pense of competitors. It was Newfoundland's misfortune to be on the wrong side of this competi-
tive relationship. 
39 Ronald I. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development (Washington, 1973) 
pp. 10-11. 
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In these circumstances it becomes attractive for governments to turn to 
foreign entrepreneurship and direct investment with the consequent dangers 
that "Learning-by-doing becomes learning-by-watching" and a colonial econ-
omy develops "where expatriates operate with relatively freer access to an ex-
ternal capital market in such a way as to emasculate domestic entrepreneurial 
development." 40 
McKinnon's analysis offers an insight into why the rural Newfoundland 
economy, when confronted with an expanding market in an industry where 
its experience and skill was immense, did not respond in the fashion which 
Hymer and Resnick would predict. The original migratory fishery from the 
West Country was an industry of vertically integrated firms, extending through 
production and processing to marketing. The settled fishery of the nineteenth 
century saw the dissolution of this integration, with the marketing firms 
(which is where capital was accumulated and profits concentrated) gradually 
withdrawing into St. John's, leaving production and processing in the hands 
of family units. This may have been efficient for the extensive growth of a 
labour intensive and technically stagnant industry; but it did not serve either 
the industry or the country when, at the end of the century, extensive growth 
reached a ceiling and rising world demand and per capita incomes called 
for more output, more diversified output, and better quality. Newfoundland 
producers were ill equipped to respond to these opportunities — and re-
mained so well into this century — because their knowledge of distant market 
opportunities and requirements was very imperfect and because in any case, 
they had no access to the capital for investment that was necessary for a re-
sponse. The withdrawal of the merchant houses from the outports and their 
direct involvement in production together with the absence of any rural 
banking structures, meant that the countryside was denuded of capital other 
than the short term financing provided to fishing families by the agents or de-
pendents of the St. John's firms to pursue the traditional fishery.41 The St. 
John firms, after almost a century of withdrawal from direct involvement in 
production, and with a generally jaundiced view of the industry's prospects 
relative to the returns in wholesale and retail trade and safe overseas securities, 
were unlikely to supply capital either as direct or portfolio investors. The only re-
maining agency was government. The Department of Marine and Fisheries ex-
panded technical services to the industry, but otherwise its role was limited 
to exhortation. When one of its Ministers, William Coaker, attempted to 
legislate national quality standards and a national approach to the salt cod 
markets, his effort was broken by powerful opposition within the trade. 
Hence in Newfoundland there was no government initiative in the fisheries 
40 Ibid., p. 29. 
41 A similar hypothesis has been developed in Cato Wadel, "The Peasant Economy of the New-
foundland Inshore Fisherman" (Paper delivered to the Association of North Eastern Anthropolo-
gists, Dartmouth College, March 1968). 
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equivalent to that in Iceland and Norway. The explanation for this lies in the 
fact that members of government were not clearly distinguishable from the 
mercantile class which dominated the economy; that leading politicians did 
not see the industry as a growth pole for the future; and finally, whatever 
the politics of the matter, government revenues that might have been 
ploughed into the industry were already heavily committed to servicing an 
imposing external debt. In these circumstances the Newfoundland fishing 
industry began to slip from first rank in the world, and perhaps for that reason 
Newfoundland began a steady march towards stagnation and dependence. 
The penalty of neglect began to be exacted in the 1920s. In a much more 
competitive market, and with the return to Newfoundland waters after several 
centuries absence of southern European fishing fleets, the country's share 
of cod landings off North America and Greenland fell from 49 per cent 
in 1920 to 41 per cent in 1930 and 37 per cent in 1938.42 The slide continued 
after the War when, to the competition from southern Europe, was added 
the more massive invasion of the eastern European fleets. The Newfoundland 
share of fish landings in the ICNAF convention area fell from 18 per cent 
in 1954 to 14 per cent in 1969, and in sub-areas 2,3 and 4, which are the waters 
proximate to Newfoundland, the share of landings fell from 30 per cent 
in 1954 to 20 per cent in 1969.43 The country had failed to establish economic 
control over the resource and accordingly gave up its exploitation to con-
suming countries. 
Economic stagnation was highly visible in rural Newfoundland from the 
1920s. In 1911 there were some 43,800 fishermen and in 1935 around 35,000 
representing 53 per cent and 40 per cent of the labour force. The value of 
fish exports stagnated in the 1920s and fell drastically in the 1930s, but the 
terms of trade also deteriorated relative to that of the first two decades of 
the century.44 Stagnation was also characteristic of the subsistence farming 
sector. In 1911 there was 112,600 improved acres, but this fell to 89,800 in 
1921 and 71,700 in 1935, with a corresponding decline in improved acreage/cul-
tivator from 2.9 to 2.3 and to 1.8 acres.45 While the volume of root crops (the 
principal field production) rose modestly in the hard 1930s, it was 
still pitifully low at 59 bushels of potatoes per fisherman in 1935 and 
2.7 barrels of turnips.46 Livestock ratios were stagnant over the entire first 
half of this century and by 1935 the country had only 0.41 milk cows per 
42 Gerharsen, Salted Cod, Table A-3. 
43 Copes, Resettlement, Table 25. 
44 Alexander, "New Newfoundland". Table 3. 
45 Calculated from Tenth Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, Part III, Vol II, Sec. II, 
Tables 2, 4, and 5. 
46 Calculated from Eleventh Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, Vol. II, Tables 2 and 6. 
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fisherman, 0.28 cattle, 0.24 pigs, 2. .50 sheep and 11.0 poultry.47 The political 
price of this condition was the loss of self-government, but the economic 
and social costs were hardly less severe. Between 1884-1945 Newfoundland 
lost between 65,000 and 100,000 people through net migration.48 For those 
who stayed in the country, there was an infant mortality rate which deterior-
ated steadily from 17 per cent in excess of the Canadian level in 1922 to 55 
per cent in 1931/35, and to 65 per cent in 1941/45.49 In Newfoundland in 
1931 some 36 per cent of all deaths were young people under age 14, com-
pared with 28 per cent in Canada, and by 1946 it was 33 per cent compared 
with 18 per cent. In 1941 cause specific death rates in Newfoundland were 
skewed towards those associated with poverty: tuberculosis 171/100,000 
(53 in Canada); congenital malformations 112 (71) and influenza, bronchitis 
and pneumonia 164 (76).50 Table 4 draws together various estimates of Nation-
al Income. It suggests that the difference in the relative size of the Newfound-
land and Canadian economies widened from the late nineteenth century. The 
indication that per capita incomes also widened in the twentieth century over 
the nineteenth is subject to all the limitations of the accuracy and meaningful-
ness of the estimates. But even if relative per capita income was unchanged 
this represented growing absolute disparities. More useful than a New-
foundland-Canadian comparison, however, is one between Newfoundland and 
Iceland. Compared with the latter before it staked its prosperity on the fishery 
Newfoundland was a locus of prosperity and economic power. But by 1938 
the National Income of Iceland in $US was some $27 million and the per 
capita income around $220 — that is, Newfoundland's per capita income was 
at best only some 70 per cent of Iceland's, and the distribution of its income 
was undoubtedly more unequal.51 
The Commission Government which assumed control of the country in 
1934 was dominated by the United Kingdom members and operated in the 
shadow of the Amulree Commission's reflections on the unwisdom of a small 
and poor country attempting to become anything else. It fixed its sights on 
reorganizing the public services and the fisheries. Long run development 
issues received little attention, and perhaps the magnitude of the immediate 
problems excused the Commission's myopia.52 In two documents concerned 
47 loc. cit. 
48 Estimated in Alexander, "Newfoundland", Table 6, p. 28. 
49 These and the following social indicators are calculated from D.B.S.. Province of Newfound-
land Statistical Background, Tables 24 and 26. 
50 Canadians, of course, excelled in the deaths of affluence: cancer, heart disease and violence. 
51 Calculated from Chamberlain, Economic Development of Iceland, Appendix, p. 134. at 
official Kronar-Dollar exchange rates as in Appendix, p. 125. 
52 Not, however, in the view of one of its members, Thomas Lodge, who upon resignation wrote 
one of the most interesting books on Newfoundland, Dictatorship in Newfoundland (London, 
1929). The best analysis of the Commission is in S.J.R. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland (Toronto, 
1971). A useful collection of documents and linking commentary is Peter Neary, The Political 
Economy of Newfoundland (Toronto, 1973). 
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TABLE 4 
ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL INCOME: 
NEWFOUNDLAND AND CANADA 
Newfoundland Canada 
Nfld NI/Capita 
NI* Nl/Capita NI Nl/Capita as% of Canada 
($M) ($) ($M) ($) % 
1884 15 75 481 135 55 
1911 27 110 2,085 290 38 
1938 47 150 4,001 360 42 
1948 120 350 12,000 936 37 
Note: The detail for the 1911 Newfoundland estimate is provided in Appendix A, and for other 
years as indicated in the note on sources. The meaningfullness of National Income esti-
mates as an index of economic well-being, and especially as a base for intertemporal 
and international comparisons, is too obvious to require elaboration. The comparisons 
in this table are on the basis of approaches as conceptually similar as possible. Obviously, 
the Newfoundland estimates represent extremely crude indicators, but even if the estimate 
for 1911 was out by as much as 25% — which is unlikely — the gross comparative position 
would not be significantly different. 
•NATIONAL INCOME 
Sources: For 1884 estimate for Newfoundland see, David Alexander, "New Newfoundland", 
Table 4; for Canada see, Urquhart and Buckley, Canadian Historical Statistics, Series 
E214-244. For 1911 Newfoundland estimate see Appendix A; for Canada see, Urquhart 
and Buckley, Series E202-213. For 1938 Newfoundland see, MacKay, Newfoundland, 
Appendix B; for Canada see, Urquhart and Buckley, Series El-12. For 1948 Newfound-
land see, D.B.S., Province of Newfoundland Statistical Background, Table 105; for 
Canada see, Urquhart and Buckley, Series El-12. 
with long-run reconstruction, however, the classic issues of development in 
a small country emerge once again. 
J.H. Gorvin was a Principal in the British Ministry of Agriculture and Fish-
eries seconded to the Commission at the end of the 1930s to report on devel-
opment prospects.53 The task, he suggested, could be "approached with some 
optimism because the country's resources have been by no means fully ex-
ploited". But it required, in his view, a "co-ordination of effort" and an attack 
53 Papers relating to a Long Range Reconstruction Policy in Newfoundland: Interim Report 
(Newfoundland Government, 1938), quotations from pp. 14-17. 
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"over a wide front by a combination of the best brains the trade and industry 
of the country and the Departments of Government can produce". He stressed 
the need for a higher level of general education among the population and 
the deepening of technical skills. For the short run Gorvin emphasized agri-
cultural development, a road system to facilitate commercial production, 
national marketing boards and local co-operatives, and light industries in food 
processing. With respect to more grandiose schemes he was sufficiently acute 
to note that in Newfoundland "when a general state of hopelessness has been 
reached, the question of the establishment of new industries is brought for-
ward". But if such projects were to be considered, he thought the hydro 
based export industries of Norway an appropriate model:, but he warned that 
the "attraction of capital to handle any one of these major operations is . . . 
closely bound up with long term stable Government and a change of mind 
on the part of the commercial interests in Newfoundland itself". The emphasis 
of Gorvins findings, however, was on the development potential lying within 
Newfoundland, in terms of productive resources and internal-market develop-
ment. There was nothing like a world Depression to focus attention on the 
modest potential at home. 
In 1944 the Hon. P.D.H. Dunn, Commissioner for Natural Resources, 
made a radio address wherein he sketched the outlook for the country. Ac-
cording to Dunn, the "one certain thing in the economic life of Newfoundland" 
was that "the dried codfish industry (would) not . . . provide a reasonable 
standard of comfort for the number of men who depended upon it in the past". 
The economic salvation of the country, however, lay "in a wise development 
of both the fisheries and agriculture". He hinted that the agricultural pros-
pects were limited in scale and variety of product, and that the real dynamic 
lay in fisheries development. He argued that while "the salt codfish industry 
is carried on as vigorously as possible a new industry must be created around 
it so that we can revitalise the whole of our economic life. We believe that 
this new industry must be based on the production of frozen fish . . . ." Fore-
shadowed in Dunn's address was the now famous resettlement programme: 
It should be possible to concentrate the new industry in about fifteen 
centres and by this means we will ensure a reasonable prospect of pros-
perity to a larger part of the Island and spread the benefit among a 
greater number of people than if we concentrated on one centre only. 
By making each selected centre as prosperous as possible we shall pro-
vide a strong inducement to people from less favoured communities to 
abandon localities in which they cannot hope to obtain a reasonable 
living.54 
54. Subsequently printed as Fisheries Re-Organization in Newfoundland, (St. John's, 1944), 
pp. 5-6. 
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The reorganization scheme was "essentially one for private enterprize" as-
sisted by government. Dunn thought it would cost some $15 million, raised 
domestically and abroad, although it "is our view also that in all of the new 
ventures the majority of the capital employed should be in Newfoundland 
hands so that control of the companies may rest here. Only by doing so shall 
we be certain that the future policy of the companies is determined by the 
needs of Newfoundland and not by the success or failure of operations in 
other countries." In conclusion, Dunn predicted that should the scheme fail, 
then "all else can be forgotten, and save for a few isolated centres, Newfound-
land will have to be abandoned". If it succeeded it would give the country 
a sure foundation wherein agriculture and other industries could be usefully 
and successfully developed. Dunn's prediction proved wrong in substance if 
not in spirit. But it is interesting because in contrast to the fortress mentality 
of the 1930s he shifted the emphasis back to export-led growth. Unlike the 
emphasis of the first three decades of the century, however, the key export 
sector was at last identified as a fishery under the ownership and control 
of Newfoundlanders. 
Both Gorvin and Dunn brought to Newfoundland's economic problems and 
prospects a very European point of view about societies which lay outside 
Industrial Revolution concentrations like the Ruhr and Black Country. For 
them there was nothing contradictory, odd, inferior or ignoble about econ-
omies which were small, that relied for stability and well-being as much upon 
non-market as market production, wherein a man might, in one part of the day, 
earn income by operating the most complex of modern technology while in an-
other uproot potatoes with a spade. They assumed, moreover, that economic de-
velopment was development indigenous to its location in respect to resources. 
entrepreneurship, labour and, for the most part, capital. In this respect they 
were deaf to the voice of the true British North American — as well repre-
sented in Newfoundland as the Mainland — who saw the easiest road to 'de-
velopment' as primary resource exploitation under the aegis of international 
corporations. 
It was 'British North America' that shaped Newfoundland's postwar history. 
Conforming to the traditional role of peripheral provinces, Confederation 
inevitably directed the economy's development into those sectors where it 
might have a comparative advantage — land resources and primary manu-
facturing. The Province's first Premier, moreover, held few illusions that the 
Island's economic elite could generate any alternative: 
It would not be so much a matter for public concern if our million-
aires today, making their money and living with their families in a 
capital-hungry province, instead of investing their money only in the 
wholesale and retail trade, in amusement centres, in high-rise buildings 
and countless other high- and quick-return enterprises, in and out of 
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our province, were to put large proportions of it into basic productive 
industries to strengthen the fundamental economy of the province by 
creating jobs. Even our great basic industry, the fishery, has not at-
tracted locally the capital that was needed. My administration had to 
pour many millions of dollars of public money into the fisheries, largely 
as loans, to make up for the failure of local millionaires, near-
millionaires, and other wealthy individuals and companies to do so.55 
In a colourful passage, Smallwood advances the weakness of domestic entre-
preneurship as the reason for his quest for foreign direct investment: 
It was useless to turn to the businessmen of Newfoundland. Most of 
them were scrambling around, like henhawks eyeing a chicken coop, 
for their share of the millions of family allowances and other cash 
pouring in from Ottawa. Wholesale, jobbing, retail shops, they were 
stocking up to the bursting point, telegraphing and telephoning urgently 
to the mainland for more supplies, and scouring Canada for new agen-
cies. I didn't dare venture my life in that mob of single-minded traders. 
It would be useless to talk to them about investing money in new in-
dustries, so I would have to search outside, and I did.56 
The economist would argue that Smallwood's strictures are unfair because, 
realistically, business opportunities for Newfoundlanders were confined to 
construction and the service sector by the magnitude and complexity of the 
developments in resource production.57 Such a response, however, identifies 
investment opportunities as entirely exogenous to the imagination, originality 
and skill of people in small countries. The reconstruction visions of Gorvin 
and Dunn for a 'European Newfoundland' admitted no such constraint, 
but these were made irrelevant by the post-war drive for rapid growth of 
personal, cash incomes.58 In the context of a decayed fishing industry, an in-
55 J.R. Smallwood, I Choose Canada (Toronto, 1973), p. 282. 
56 Ibid., p. 346. 
57 Such a conclusion is implied in G.N. Yannopoulos, The Development of the Newfoundland 
Economy Since Confederation (Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, University of London, 1965). Viewed 
as a customs union, Confederation had trade creating effects which reduced existing investments 
in Newfoundland secondary manufacturing and induced further concentration of investment in 
resource production. Since Newfoundland firms were small and inexperienced in resource pro-
duction, other than fish, their capital naturally flowed into construction and services in response 
to the growth of personal incomes in the 1950s and 1960s. Such an explanation, however, is less 
convincing when attention shifts to the demise of the fishing industry. 
58 Mr. Smallwood pleads that this constraint left him no choice: his famous slogan, 'develop 
or perish', did not mean "that the people would die in the streets and Newfoundland cease to be. 
It didn't mean some catastrophic blow that would annihilate the province. What it meant was 
that Newfoundlanders, especially the young ones, would never be willing to stay in a province 
that didn't give them a chance to work for a good living, a chance to rear families in independ-
ence, a chance for those families to enjoy a good life in Newfoundland." Smallwood, p. 345. 
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different industry, an indifferent entrepreneurship and the economic and 
cultural impact of Confederation, it is possible to regret the choice but diffi-
cult to fault it on pragmatic grounds even if its logic was the transformation 
of Newfoundland into an eastern extremity of mid-Canada resource camps. 
Ill 
The history traced in this essay is of a small country emerging from the 
nineteenth century with a large and reasonably prosperous peasant economy 
linked to the world by its single commercial city. It confronted towards the 
end of the century, however, the classic Malthusian problem of pre-industrial 
economies which reach a ceiling of extensive growth. In an earlier era the 
issue would have been resolved simply, if brutally: population would have ad-
justed to the resource base and the state of technology by swinging fluctu-
ations. But by the end of the nineteenth century there were the alternatives of 
migration to relieve immediate pressure and of long run development to 
build Jerusalem in the 'green and pleasant land'. Of course development then, 
as much as now, was far from a clear issue and was especially intractable for 
a small country, the leader's of which, in their realistic moments, recognized 
its material and human limitations. But the fundamental choice that faced 
such countries in the burgeoning and metropolitan dominated international 
economy was who could best generate development? Eric Kierans has rightly 
said that among the classical economists the idea was "that growth is a long 
and laborious process" which comes "from below, each man trying his best, 
with large numbers constantly entering and leaving the system".59 But for 
Newfoundland at this time there was an alternative, what Mr. Kierans calls 
"The instant development, supposedly the promise of cosmocorp investment 
and transfer of technology . . . ."60 Cosmocorps and their metropolitan home-
lands rarely made any overt promises, but the blandishments were there in the 
shape of an 'encouraging response' when a Prime Minister, like Morris, ad-
dressed leading investors in London, and in the scores of development agree-
ments that came to nothing. As Newfoundland's relative position in the world 
deteriorated, so did the ability of the population to reverse the trend. As 
Sir William Petty noted several centuries ago, men "who are in a decaying 
condition, or who have but an ill opinion of their own Concernments, instead 
of being . . . the more industrious to resist the Evils they apprehend, do con-
trariwise become the more languid and ineffectual in all their Endeavours.. ."61 
59 Kierans, "An Unsympathetic View", Nationalism and the Multi-National Enterprise, Ed. 
H.R. Hahlo, et al. (Leiden, 1973), p. 176. 
60 he. cit. 
61 Sir William Petty, Political Arithmetick (London, 1690). Preface, n.p. 
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There is still little development theory to support alternative and more 
creative directions for countries like Newfoundland,62 and the desperate re-
alities at a provincial, family and personal level inhibit the formulation of 
risky abberations.63 Development theory, the policies of federal agencies, 
and the global intimacy of ways of life imposed through modern communi-
cations,64 have reinforced for small countries an inclination to try to replicate 
the modal patterns of development which proved successful in the metropolis. 
The backward country or region is seen to be progressing not simply when 
absolute and relative income differences narrow between it and the metro-
polis but as well, when demographic patterns, industrial structure, and the 
distribution of product and income approach more closely to the structures 
of the model.65 Creativity, in this view, is limited to seizing opportunities 
more closely to replicate the economic and non-economic structures of de-
veloped coutries.66 Wassily Leontief, in a discussion of input-output analysis 
puts this bluntly when he says "that the more developed the economy, the 
more its internal structure resembles that of other developed economies".67 
He dismisses Furtado and others who argue that differing resource endow-
ments, differing wants and styles of life, call for a multiplicity of technologies 
and a multiplicity of modernities, for, 
. . . the fact is that the choice of alternative technology hardly exists. 
The process of development consists essentially in the installation and 
building of an approximation of the system embodied in the advanced 
economies of the Unites States and western Europe and, more recently, 
of the USSR . . .68 
If it could be realised, such a conception of development would lead to a 
world of pervasive sameness in patterns of consumption if not exactly (be-
cause of size and endowment) in patterns of national production. Develop-
ment then becomes a process of approaching Platonic Forms embodied in the 
62 But see Norman Girvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean 
and Latin America". Social and Economic Studies, XXII (1973). 
63 Hence, when St. John's looks for a development plan it reaches into the sagging bottom 
drawer of a Montreal planning firm rather than mobilizing the skills and views of its own citizens. 
64 As Hymer point out, however, this is not simply a matter of technology, for new technology 
increases interaction and interdependence, "but — not necessarily a hierachical structure". 
S. Hymer, "The Multi-national Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development", Economics 
and World Order, Ed. J.N. Bhagwati (London, 1972), p. 126. 
65 Apart from its frustrations, the conception of the periphery held in the centre is illustrated 
by the habit of Statistics Canada in aggregating its series by Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, Prairies 
and B.C. Provincial breakdowns for 'Atlantic' and 'Prairies' are, of course, available upon request. 
66 S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (New Haven, 1966) especially stresses this view. 
67 Leontif, "The Structure of Development", Technology and Economic Development, Ed. 
by 'Scientific American' (Baltimore, Penguin, 1965), p. 130. 
68 Ibid., p. 139. 
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real world of the metropolis and the fastest route to its achievement will be 
the corporate agents of that metropolis. To question such a course of repli-
cation is to run the risk of being not only silly but inhumane. In the Canada-
U.S.A. case, Professor Lithwick has noted that "The growing homogeneity 
of the economies has appeared to some Canadians to be a threat to the 
'national identity' ", but "given the similarities in tastes and technology, and 
the high degree of factor mobility" it is useless to resist, for an "integrated 
North American economy will maximize income in both countries and our 
reading of the past suggests that attempts to delay it have but one result; 
that is, to impose a fruitless burden on Canadians."69 In other words, imitation 
to the point of absorption is without answer. 
Only the misanthrope questions the benefits of a prosperous and growing 
economy, though not only he enquires about definitions. Not even a twentieth 
century William Morris queries the value of a vigorous interregional and 
international exchange of goods, services and production factors, for it can 
be argued that only in such exchanges is to be found the economic justifi-
cation for regions within countries and nations within the world.70 But what 
This is especially true when the exchange is between a small and a large 
country. Imitation can be unfruitful because the resource endowment will not 
support it (except by sharply reduced population and a truncated distribution 
of output) because external economies do not allow it, or because it is not in 
the interests of other regions or countries. To accept the modal definition of 
successful development can be to accept perpetual backwardness along all 
dimensions: at best the periphery might achieve a shabby dignity or a shabby 
replica of what exists in the heartland. 
Obeisance to the accomplishments of the modal society and to it as the 
source of all creativity, leads via replication of structures to the destruction 
of non-economic correlates. The result is a loss of social and cultural variety 
in the world, and hence of examples of alternative ways of living for all to 
consider. This can have material consequences71 since it implies the elimin-
69 Lithwick, Economic Growth in Canada: A Quantitative Analysis (Toronto, 1970), p. 4. The 
same conclusion is reached in Ronald J. and Paul Wonnacott, Free Trade Between the United 
States and Canada (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). 
70 But this must not be a simple obeisance to classical doctrine without careful examination of 
institutions, for "the important point is to note that the general presumption of international 
trade economists in favor of free trade and free factor movements . . . does not apply to direct 
foreign investment because of the anticompetitive effect inherently associated with it." S. Hymer 
"The Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations", International Business • 1971. 
Ed. E. Cracco et. al. (East Lansing, Michigan, 1971), pp. 3-4. 
71 This point, of course, is hardly original for it has even made an appearance in the Canadian 
Journal of Economics. Clarence Barber has argued that technological knowledge could easily 
lose its scarcity and countries like Canada and the U.S.A. find themselves at a growing competi-
tive disadvantage. "In such a world there could well be a major premium to developing your 
own distinctive specialties." Barber, "A Sense of Proportion", Canadian Journal of Economics. VI, 
(1973), p. 480. 
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ation of the production of commodities and services which have their roots in 
cultural distinctiveness, a view eloquently stated by Osvaldo Sunkel: 
A nation must use its traditions, culture, values, institutions and history 
to create and achieve its own process of development and national real-
ization. To substitute imported ingredients for these elements is to des-
troy the essence of the nation and to convert its inhabitants into out-
casts, both from their own history and from that of the advanced soci-
eties. What is required is a process of modernization which is at once 
imitative and creative, based on a deliberate and conscious selection of 
what is authentically universal in modern civilization and culture, and 
based on an imagination which, can construct with these elements the 
politics, institutions, ideologies and other instruments of national de-
velopment.72 
The historical record suggests that Newfoundland borrowed injudiciously 
and lacked confidence in the potential of its indigenous resources, culture 
and skills. But Newfoundland was not unique among the Atlantic Provinces 
in these characteristics. 
The resource endowment of the Atlantic provinces could become more 
favourable in years to come, if it does, important external economies could 
emerge providing cost support to more diversified economic structures; and 
the centrality of national policy-making could shift more in the interests of 
these provinces. But if all this happened, would the sense of dependence and 
stunted development be any less acute than it is now in Ontario or Alberta? 
Is it necessarily so, as Demas implied, that a dependent country or region can 
only tinker with the production of non-tradeable goods? If a distinctive 
regional culture exists which is more than sentimental aggressiveness about a 
past long dead, then import substitution and eventual export growth can take 
place, not on inefficient replication of the output and demand patterns of 
other regions and countries, but on the basis of a distinctive demand for 
goods and services of the region which, because it originates here, will be 
uniquely efficient in its production. If this is so, then an aim of governments 
and people in the Atlantic region should be a very cautious appraisal of re-
source development by metropolitan firms for metropolitan markets. But 
pursuit of an economic provincialism which simply replicates the patterns of 
the métropole offers a bleak future, for, "Imported technology and ideas do 
not create new comparative advantages, and tariff protection does not force 
the pace of specialization."73 
72 Osvaldo Sunkel, "Latin American Underdevelopment in the Year 2000", Economics and 
World Order, p. 220. 
73 Eric Kierans, "Towards a New National Policy", An Industrial Strategy for Canada, Ed. 
Abraham Rotstein (Toronto, 1972), p. 88. 
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APPENDIX A 
NATIONAL INCOME 1910/11 
Population 1911 - 242,619 
Goods Production (Exports)1 
Fishery 8,798,932 
Agriculture 7,577 
Forestry 1,461,331 
Minerals 1,565,979 
Other (excld. re-exports) 29,790 11,863,609 
Goods Production (Domestic 
Market) 
Agricultural2 5,388,559 
Manufacturing3 3,000,000 
Sawmills4 717,717 
Construction & Repair5 3,000,000 12,106,276 
Service Production 
Government Expenditure6 2,054,390 
Transportation7 626,305 
Other Services8 600,000 3,280,695 
Less estimated payments abroad 
of enclave industries in 
Forestry and Minerals (say 
a third of export values) 1,000,000 
National Income $26,850,580 
National Income/Head $110 
1 Customs Returns. 
2 Estimates, Department of Agriculture and Mines, less experts. 
3 Wages and Salaries estimated from incomplete returns of 1911 census. 
4 Returns of the Crown Lands Department, net of pulpwood. 
5 Approximately 4.000 houses were built or under construction or repair by estimate of the 1911 
census, say at an income to builders (whether commercial or not) of $800 per house. In Canada 
in 1911 the average value of new housing units completed was about $2,000 (Urquhart and Buck-
ley, R149-150). 
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Confederation shielded the Maritimes from the brutal economic and polit-
ical collapse which devastated Newfoundland but it did not shelter it from be-
coming a consuming backwater of the metropolis. If there are lessons from 
the more courageous, if foolhardy, history of Newfoundland, it is to concen-
trate on export sectors which can be dominated by domestic production 
factors; to stimulate local deviations in patterns of consumption in the hope 
they might spawn firms and products with unique services and goods to offer 
the world; and above all, to frankly acknowledge that there is no easy road to 
development. In the long run a country or a province must have faith that its 
residents can do more than provide semi-skilled labour and middle-manage-
ment for international corporations. 
6 Estimates for 1910/11 less debt servicing and transfers. 
7 Earnings given in the Annual Report of The Reid Newfoundland Company only — an obvious 
understatement. 
8 At most only the income produced of some 6,132 people — doctors, lawyers, merchants 
and traders and employees in offices and shops (some 10% of the labour force) is in question 
here. Most of this income produced is already accounted for under other lines. Arbitrarily $100 
per service employee is included to compensate for underestimation. 
Sources: Journal of the House of Assembly (Appendices) 1911 and 1912. Census of Newfound-
land and Labrador, 1911. 
